The data for these user graphs, along with historical Tor network data and ongoing performance statistics, are all available at https://metrics.torproject.org/. Our WECSR'10 paper [3] explains our aggregation techniques and why we think they're safe-we'd love for you to show us that we're wrong. Further, if you're working on Tor-related research, please talk to us (https://torproject.org/research) so we can explain what's available and help interpret your results.
Some open questions from the anonymity field.
Here are a few examples of open anonymity and blocking-resistance problems: 1) How effective is the traffic correlation attack really? Tor's threat model assumes that an adversary who can see a traffic flow into the Tor network and the corresponding flow out of the Tor network can correlate them with high probability and low false positives. Recent results from Steven Murdoch [4] show confirmation attacks even when both sides only see a small sample of traffic on each side. But how quick can the attack actually be in practice, using how little traffic? Are there effective padding schemes to make correlation less effective?
2) For various diversity metrics (like entropy), how has the diversity of the Tor network changed over time? How robust is it to change or attack? 3) How can we automatically recognize blocking events-when Tor relays are censored at a firewall by destination address or by traffic flow characteristics? 4) Clients who are censored from the public Tor relays can use private addresses to "bridge" into the public Tor network. What strategies should we use to give out these addresses such that legitimate users get enough addresses but adversaries can't learn too many? 5) How can we make it hard for censors to recognize Tor traffic flows by content (e.g. distinguishing Tor's handshake from other expected protocols) and by traffic characteristics (packet size, volume, and timing)? We need obfuscation metrics to let us anticipate which protocols will blend in better with background traffic or otherwise defeat deep packet inspection (DPI) algorithms.
